

Kinds, epistemic indefinites, and *some*-exclamatives¹

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Abstract. Although exclamative sentences have garnered much attention over the years, most work has focused on understanding what have been called *wh*-exclamatives and nominal exclamatives, to the exclusion of other types of exclamative constructions. I focus on what I call *some*-exclamatives, clausal exclamatives where the predicate uses the determiner *some*. I provide an analysis of these exclamatives, showing how their existence is motivated by independent properties of exclamative constructions and *some*.

Keywords: exclamatives, exclamation, genericity, kinds, indefinites

1. Introduction

In discussion of exclamatives in English, the vast majority of attention has been focused on analyzing and explaining the properties of *wh*-exclamatives (such as those in (1)), nominal exclamatives (as in (2)), and what Taniguchi (this volume) calls negative inversion exclamatives (like in (3)). These tend to form the canonical cases of exclamative sentences discussed in English.

- (1) a. What a large watermelon!
b. How beautiful the birds sing!
- (2) The peppers he eats!
- (3) Aren't you happy!

However, other exclamative and exclamative-like structures exist in English that have received much less attention compared to the aforementioned ones. One example of such an exclamative (and the topic of this paper) is a construction making use of a DP headed by the determiner *some*, what I call *some*-exclamatives. Although *some*-exclamatives have been discussed before (Israel, 1996, 2011), they remain relatively understudied compared to the better-understood *wh*-exclamatives and nominal exclamatives.

Some examples of these exclamatives are given in (4) through (7), with a paraphrase underneath each example. These exclamatives express a belief on the part of the speaker that the subject of the exclamative is of the type denoted by the noun phrase complement to *some* (such as *dancer* in (4)), but that their instantiation of this property is unexpected in some way.

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- (4) Boy, was she (ever) some dancer!
 “She was a dancer and she was an exceptional dancer.”
- (5) That was some wine she brought to the party!
 “She brought wine to the party and it was very good wine.”
- (6) Some friend she turned out to be!
 “She was a friend and she was a particularly poor friend.”
- (7) It’s going to be some party!
 “We’re having a party and it’s going to be a great party.”

Israel suggests that the exclamative meaning in these is likely to be related to the hedging (epistemic indefinite) use of *some*. I will argue that the exclamative use arises from an interaction of two components. First, like Israel, I suppose that the epistemic indefinite use of *some* plays a role by creating a set of alternatives, and furthermore propose the existence of an exclamative operator that structures this set of alternatives and asserts an attitude towards a particular alternative from the set.

In looking at this particular type of exclamative structure, several questions arise. First, how does this type of exclamative structure relate to other types of exclamatives in English? Namely, what do *some*-exclamatives have in common with other exclamatives in English, such as *wh*-exclamatives, nominal exclamatives, and negative inversion exclamatives? To answer this question, it’s necessary to ask a second question: what are the properties of *some* that allow for it to be involved in generating this exclamative meaning? This paper concentrates on this second question, in particular looking at the lexical semantics of *some* and how its indefinite meaning allows for an exclamative meaning to arise. Additionally, this paper looks at not only how the exclamative meaning arises, but also what is exclaimed about. I claim that *some*-exclamatives exclaim about a kind, in the sense of Carlson (1977).

This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides additional discussion of *some*-exclamatives; I distinguish *some* from the singular indefinite *a*, motivate *some*-exclamatives as exclamatives, and suggest that certain types of theories of exclamatives are not a very good fit for analyzing *some*-exclamatives. Then, in section 3, I argue that *some*-exclamatives are sensitive to kinds. In sections 4 and 5 I provide my analysis, with section 6 discussing additional data outside the purview of this paper. I wrap up my discussion in section 7.

2. Background

2.1. The data

Some-exclamatives come in two variants, what I call the in-situ variant and the preposed variation. In the in-situ variant, as in (8), the DP headed by *some* appears after the copula. In the preposed variant, illustrated with (9), the DP appears before the subject. In this paper, I focus on the

in-situ variant, with the assumption that it's the underlying variant, while the preposed version is derived through movement of the *some*-headed DP.

- (8) a. John is some lawyer! (in-situ)
 b. This is going to be some party! (in-situ)
- (9) a. Some lawyer John is! (preposed)
 b. Some party this is going to be! (preposed)

Some generally doesn't give rise to exclamatives. One condition that must be met in order for the exclamative interpretation to be available is that there must be a particular intonational contour on the *some* indefinite. When this intonational contour is removed (marked with \downarrow in the examples below), the exclamative meaning is unavailable, and the ordinary indefinite meaning arises.

- (10) a. That was some \downarrow wine she brought to the party!
 b. #That was some wine she brought to the party.
- (11) a. It's going to be some \downarrow party!
 b. #It's going to be some party.

I propose that the intonation plays a role in creating the exclamative, in marking the presence of a morpheme carrying an exclamative operator. This operator, as I develop later, structures the set of alternatives denoted by the sentential core of the exclamative, and assert an attitude towards one of the alternatives.

Although *some*-exclamatives make use of *some*, which is used in constructing indefinite DPs in English, it is not simply being an indefinite that allows for *some* to have an exclamative use; English lacks a corresponding *a*-exclamative (as would be intended with the examples in (12)).

- (12) a. #John is a lawyer!
 b. #It's going to be a party!

This lack of an *a*-exclamative suggests that there are additional properties of *some* that make it well-suited for being used in an exclamative. The next section briefly discusses how *some* and *a* differ.

2.2. *Some* is an epistemic indefinite

How does *some* differ from the singular indefinite *a*? The primary way that they differ is that *some* is an epistemic indefinite. Epistemic indefinites are indefinites that impose restrictions on the speaker regarding their knowledge of who the indefinite refers to. Unreduced *some* is the canonical case of this type of indefinite in English, although epistemic indefinites are well-attested cross-linguistically as well (Haspelmath, 1997).

In English, *some* contrasts with *a* in committing the speaker to uncertainty regarding the referent of the indefinite. The speaker may know some description of the individual, but the particular individual who satisfies the description cannot be known.² The short exchange in (13) illustrates this, where A's use of *some* commits A to not being able to identify the individual who was shot. B's question regarding the identity of the individual is odd because of speaker A's commitments due to using *some*.

- (13) A: Some cabinet minister has been shot!
B: #Who?

In contrast, although *a* is compatible with a lack of knowledge, it doesn't require it in the way that *some* does. The exchange in (14) is acceptable, since although the use of the indefinite may signal that the speaker does not know who was shot, it doesn't commit the speaker to ignorance.

- (14) A: A cabinet minister has been shot!
B: Who?

This contrast shows that there must be additional constraints on the use of *some* in order to capture a difference between *some* and the singular indefinite *a*. In my analysis, I will make a proposal for this difference that builds on work by Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002).

2.3. Is this really an exclamative?

Michaelis and Lambrecht (1996) note a collection of properties that exclamative constructions prototypically have. These are listed in (15). I argue that *some*-exclamatives should be considered as a type of exclamative based on the observation that *some*-exclamatives exhibit many of these properties.

- (15) Semantico-pragmatic properties of exclamatives (Michaelis and Lambrecht, 1996)
- a. presupposed open proposition
 - b. scalar extent
 - c. assertion of affective stance: expectation contravention
 - d. identifiability of described referent
 - e. deixis

First, *some*-exclamatives exhibit the (a) property in the above list. What Michaelis and Lambrecht mean by presupposed open proposition is that exclamatives are factive. *Some*-exclamatives are also factive, as can be shown by using the 'Hey, wait a minute!' test for presuppositions (Shanon, 1976; von Stechow, 2004).

²With some caveats, of course. *Some* can also express indifference with respect to the identity of the individual as well, which is plausibly related to its ignorance use. *Some* is also sensitive to different types of knowledge regarding an individual, such as naming them versus pointing them out in a crowd. See Maher 2013 for some discussion of this latter point.

- (16) A: John is some lawyer! He always loses his cases!
 B: Hey, wait a minute! I didn't know John was a lawyer.

As already noted, *some*-exclamatives seem to exclaim about some high scalar property as well, exhibiting the (b) property above. That exclamatives also express an attitude can be considered similar to the (c) property in the list. Finally, by deixis (property (e)) Michaelis and Lambrecht mean that the attitude in an exclamative is generally anchored both personally (with respect to an individual—the speaker) and temporally (to the speech time). This seems to hold in part for *some*-exclamatives as well, where the attitude is anchored to the speaker by default.

These properties also match in some ways with Zanuttini and Portner (2003)'s claim that exclamative constructions are factive, express a sense of noteworthiness, and cannot function in question/answer pairs. Given the similarities between *some*-exclamatives and other exclamatives in terms of their meanings, then, I will consider *some*-exclamatives to be a type of exclamative construction.

2.4. Theories of exclamatives

As exclamative constructions have been an important area for research for some time, there have been many different proposals for exclamatives in general as well as for constructions in particular languages. Although I cannot hope to do a thorough review of all of them, I'll note (following Castroviejo Miró (2008)) that the field has in some ways coalesced around three main types of theories regarding exclamatives: theories that assimilate root exclamatives to embedded exclamatives, theories that treat exclamatives as degree constructions, and theories that derive exclamatives from question semantics.

One style of theory of exclamatives attempts to understand exclamatives by assimilating root *wh*-exclamatives, such as those in (17), to embedded exclamatives like those in (18) (D'Avis, 2002; Abels, 2005).

- (17) a. How tall John is! (root exclamative)
 b. What a success the party was! (root exclamative)
- (18) a. It's amazing how tall John is! (embedded exclamative)
 b. I'm surprised what a success the party was! (embedded exclamative)

Embedded exclamatives clearly inherit much of their semantic force from the predicate they are embedded under (such as *amazing*). The hope for this style of theory is that root exclamatives can be represented by assuming that they too are embedded under an *amazing*-predicate, at some level of representation.

The difficulty with extending this approach to *some*-exclamatives is that *some*-exclamatives do not embed under *amazing*, *disappointing*, or other predicates we might have reasonably expected

would be candidate predicates for this type of theory. This is shown in (19). It would seem then that, whatever the merits of this analysis, it is difficult to naively extend it to *some*-exclamatives.

(19) *It's amazing/disappointing/unexpected (that) John is some friend!

I turn now to a different type of analysis of exclamative constructions. In contrast with question theories of exclamatives, which treat exclamatives as being underlyingly questions, degree theories of exclamatives treat exclamative constructions as being on par with other degree constructions, such as measure phrase modification or comparatives. In other words, rather than accounting for the semantics of exclamatives by saying that they are sets of propositions, the semantics of exclamatives is accounted for by assuming that exclamatives make use of sets of degrees.

Some accounts in this type of theory are those of Castroviejo Miró (2006) and Rett (2008, 2011). Castroviejo Miró argues for a degree analysis of *wh*-exclamatives in Catalan based on the observation that the degree word *tan* in Catalan occurs in both exclamative environments and in canonical degree constructions. What makes exclamatives different from other sentence types is how they update the common ground. Assertions update the common ground to exclude worlds incompatible with the assertion, while exclamatives in this analysis background the information contributed by the degree construction, and implicate a speaker-oriented attitude towards a degree.

Rett (2011) also argues that exclamatives are degree constructions. She observes that exclamatives often make use of overt gradable expressions, such as in (20). When no gradable predicate is overt, however, a covert gradable predicate M-OP is used, where M-OP measures over a contextually salient dimension (in the cases in (21) below, the dimensions corresponding to *delicious* and *exotic* might be licit in context).

(20) a. What delicious desserts John baked!
b. The exotic places John visited!

(21) a. What M-OP desserts John baked!
b. The M-OP places John visited!

The core of the exclamative, for Rett, is a set of degrees (rather than a set of propositions). A process of default existential closure over degrees converts this into a proposition. A covert illocutionary operator expresses surprise towards that degree.

But, it's not obvious that this is the correct path to go down in order to analyze *some*-exclamatives as well. The reason for this is the nature of M-OP; M-OP is used to coerce gradability where none existed before, using some contextual salient scale. The difficulty lies in the fact that *some* seems to already be involved with scalar meaning, namely quantity. For instance, the question-answer pair in (22) shows that *some* can be used to provide an answer expressing a quantity. Moreover, *some* is well-known to be part of a scale with the quantifier *all*.

- (22) A: Was any of the wine spilled?
B: Some (of it).

Since *some* participates in a scale denoting quantity already, it seems reasonable to think that *some*-exclamatives should have an interpretation where they express surprise at a quantity. This type of reading is available with nominal exclamatives as in (23), showing that in principle an exclamative could have this type of reading. However, *some*-exclamatives do not seem to be compatible with a quantity reading, as (23) demonstrates.

- (23) The wine we drank! It would've filled buckets!
(24) *That was some wine we drank! It would've filled buckets!

Finally, it's not clear that *some* is involved with degree constructions in general. For instance, generally expressions of the style in (25) aren't allowed in many varieties of English, including mine, further weakening a case for *some* having a degree component to it.

- (25) a. *some tall!
b. *some sweet!

With these facts in mind, I set aside the possibility that *some*-exclamatives should be analyzed as degree constructions (but this of course doesn't rule out other exclamative constructions as being degree constructions).

Moving on, another sort of theory of exclamatives treats exclamatives as being semantically related to questions. Specifically, the propositional content of an exclamative is equivalent to that of a question, but the difference between a question and an exclamative lies in their sentential force. These kinds of theories adopt a semantics for questions in the style of Hamblin (1973), Karttunen (1977), and Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984).

Hamblin (1973) proposed that the denotations of questions were sets of propositions corresponding to answers to that question. A question of the form *Who came to the party?* could be considered as having the set of alternatives in (26), for instance, with *who* signaling the syntactic position where the alternative propositions should have their content varied. This set raises an issue as to which particular proposition is true.

$$(26) \quad \llbracket \textit{Who came to the party?} \rrbracket = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Mary came to the party,} \\ \text{Bill came to the party,} \\ \text{Bob came to the party,} \\ \dots \end{array} \right\}$$

This view of questions has come to be quite influential, and, with modifications later by Karttunen (1977) and Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984), the view that questions denote sets of propositions has become a dominant view in their analysis.

Under normal assumptions, declarative sentences denote propositions, functions from worlds to truth values, type $\langle s, t \rangle$. However, if this is so, what do sentences that aren't declarative denote? Hamblin proposes that questions are sets of propositions, a view further developed by Karttunen (1977) and Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984). The question *Who is coming?* might be represented as in (27).

$$(27) \quad \llbracket \textit{Who is coming?} \rrbracket = \lambda p \exists x [p(w) \wedge p = \lambda w' [\mathbf{come}(w')(x)]]$$

Gutiérrez-Rexach (1996) adopts this view of questions and proposes that both questions and exclamatives have, at their core, essentially the same denotations. What sets exclamatives apart from questions is the use of an illocutionary operator *EXC* which operates on a variable indexed to the speaker, the world, and a set of propositions. Gutiérrez-Rexach's definition for this is as in (28), where *EMOT* is a set of emotive properties that speakers can have towards propositions, such as surprise and amazement.

$$(28) \quad \text{Let } a \text{ be the speaker, } w \text{ a world (typically the actual world), } p \text{ a proposition, and } P \in \textit{EMOT} \text{ (the set of emotive properties). Then,}$$

$$\textit{EXC} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lambda a \lambda w \lambda p_{\langle s, t \rangle} \exists P_{\langle s, \langle st, et \rangle \rangle} [P(w)(p)(a)]$$

A somewhat different theory of exclamatives is that of Zanuttini and Portner (2003). In their analysis, Zanuttini and Portner follow Gutiérrez-Rexach in analyzing the core of a *wh*-exclamative sentence as being a question. Where Zanuttini and Portner's analysis differs is in the source of the exclamative reading itself. They argue that exclamatives have at their core a notion of domain widening.

The concept of domain widening here is related to the analysis of *any* in Kadmon and Landman (1993), where *any* is a simple indefinite determiner, but shifts the domain of quantification to a stronger domain when embedded under negation. In Zanuttini and Portner, domain widening applies at the level of propositions. Domain widening applies to the set of propositions denoted by the sentential core of the exclamative, and widens this set to include propositions not previously under consideration. Their definition of widening is provided in (29).

$$(29) \quad \text{Widening} \quad \text{(Zanuttini and Portner, 2003)}$$

For any clause S containing R_{widening} , widen the initial domain of quantification for R_{widening} , $D1$, to a new domain, $D2$, such that

- i. $\llbracket S \rrbracket^{w, D2} - \llbracket S \rrbracket^{w, D1} \neq 0$ and
- ii. $\forall x \forall y [(x \in D1 \ \& \ y \in (D2 - D1)) \rightarrow x < y]$

To illustrate how this works, let's consider the exclamative in (30). Zanuttini and Portner follow Karttunen (1977) in treating questions as denoting sets of true answers, so the set of alternatives for this exclamative is as in (31).

$$(30) \quad \text{What peppers he eats!}$$

- (31) $\llbracket \textit{What peppers he eats!} \rrbracket$
 = $\{p : p \text{ is true in } w \text{ and } \exists a \text{ such that } p = [\textit{'he eats } a']\}$
 = $\{\textit{'he eats poblanos'}, \textit{'he eats serranos'}, \textit{'he eats jalapeños'}\}$

To build the exclamative interpretation, the domain of this set of alternatives is expanded to include propositions that weren't under consideration before. In the set in (32), which has undergone widening, the proposition *he eats habaneros* is now included. In essence, what the widening operation does is build the interpretation that this person eats a variety of peppers, and he even eats these extremely spicy peppers, habaneros. If there are any other peppers he eats, they're not worth our consideration, since they've fallen outside of the widened domain.

- (32) $\{\textit{'he eats poblanos'}, \textit{'he eats serranos'}, \textit{'he eats jalapeños'}, \textit{'he eats habaneros'}\}$

The difficulty in extending a question theory of exclamatives to *some*-exclamatives, however, is that *some*-exclamatives share little with questions in their surface structure. However, under some recent analyses (such as Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002)) indefinites do share semantic and pragmatic properties with questions, in that both interrogative sentences and declarative sentences with indefinites can be modeled as denoting sets of propositional alternatives. In the next sections, I develop a theory of *some*-exclamatives that builds on this kind of representation.

3. Kinds and *some*-exclamatives

I argue that, at their core, *some*-exclamatives are ultimately kind-related. That is to say, *some*-exclamatives make assertions involving kinds, as opposed to (say) degrees. There are two important pieces of evidence that kinds are involved in *some*-exclamatives. First, NPs that do not have clear, well-established kinds are odd in *some*-exclamatives. Going back to Carlson (1977), it's been argued that reference to kinds depends on the accessibility of an established kind. Since green bottles (in (33a)) are not an established kind, they also do not allow for subkinds, and hence are illicit in *some*-exclamatives. A similar line of reasoning holds for (33b), as people that are in the next room do not form a kind.

- (33) a. ??This is some green bottle!
 b. #John is some person from the next room!

As noted by Constantinescu (2011), some nouns do not have readily accessible stereotypical properties associated with them, such as *building* or *room*. Since kinds correspond to general properties that characterize groups of individuals, we might suppose that the lack of stereotypical properties for *building* and *room* would make subkinds for them difficult to construe in many contexts. This predicts that *building* and *room* would be difficult to use in *some*-exclamatives, which seems to be the case (34). Other nouns that lack stereotypical properties, such as *non-Methodist*, are also difficult to use. The difficulty in using these nouns that do not denote kinds is another piece of evidence that *some*-exclamatives are kind-related.

- (34) a. ??This is some building!
 b. ??This is some room!

(35) ??He is some non-Methodist!

Finally, an additional piece of evidence suggesting that there is reference to kinds in *some*-exclamatives can be found by looking at post-nominal adjectives like *navigable* and *visible*. As noted by Bolinger (1967), these adjectives obligatorily get temporary, episodic interpretations when used post-nominally, as in (36). However, when these adjectives are used in the canonical pre-nominal position, like in (37), these adjectives either get the episodic interpretation, or an interpretation where they are commenting on inherent, stable properties.

Larson and Marušič (2004) go a step further and claim that this is a reflection of a stage-level/individual-level distinction, in the sense of Carlson (1977), where stage-level properties are temporary properties applying to spatio-temporally located stages of individuals, while individual-level properties are permanent properties applying to the whole individuals themselves. This idea is closely related to kinds, in that instantiations of kinds (but not kinds themselves) are the sorts of objects that stage-level predications can be made of.

(36) a. the stars visible (stage-level only)
b. the rivers navigable (stage-level only)

(37) a. the visible stars (stage-level or individual-level)
b. the navigable rivers (stage-level or individual-level)

In *some*-exclamatives, pre-nominal adjectives are allowed, as shown in (38), while the same adjective is barred post-nominally. If Larson and Marušič (2004) are correct in identifying the post-nominal position as being related to stage-level interpretation, then this is further support for a kind-level interpretation being used in *some*-exclamatives. As episodic stage-level interpretations must be predicated of individuals, the fact that these post-nominal adjectives are allergic to the noun phrase in *some*-exclamatives suggests that the NP is also not a predicate of individuals.

(38) a. This is some navigable river! (We barely made it to the river mouth alive!)
b. These are some visible stars! (I can barely see them, and I know where to look!)

Finally, it should also be noted that Weir (2012) has proposed that, in certain cases, the determiner *some* (in its more familiar use) is sensitive to kinds. He notices examples such as (39), where what the speaker is expressing ignorance about is which kind of object is being referred to. These examples cannot be paraphrased with the form ‘I saw a contraption in the copy room and I don’t know which contraption it was,’ but must be paraphrased with something more like ‘I saw a contraption in the copy room and I don’t know what kind of contraption it was.’

(39) a. I saw some contraption in the copy room this morning.
b. I came home to find some plant growing through a hole in my wall.
c. Doctor, some growth appeared on my arm. Should I be worried?

To conclude this, I will assume that kinds play a role in the interpretation of *some*-exclamatives. In particular, I'll suggest that *some*-exclamatives make reference to subkinds of the kind denoted by the NP that the determiner *some* combines with.

4. Kinds within the DP


In the previous section, I argue that *some*-exclamatives involve reference to kinds, at some level. The locus for reference to kinds in *some*-exclamatives, I'll assume, is within the DP. I mention a few proposals that form the background to my analysis in this section, where I will ultimately assume a model that is similar in spirit to that of Zamparelli (1995)'s idea of a layered DP.

There are many proposals that put reference to kinds with the DP. One proposal is Zamparelli (1995). Zamparelli suggests that the DP be expanded into a number of functional projections (as in (40)). This creates a division of labor between the various projects in the structure; different types of semantic information are available at different levels in the DP structure, creating a close connection between the semantic derivation and the syntactic derivation.

Gehrke and McNally (2013) argue for a system similar to that of Zamparelli (1995), with kinds represented low within the DP. However, rather than treating the noun as directly denoting a kind, as Zamparelli does, they suggest that common nouns denote properties of kinds (see also McNally and Boleda 2004).

$$(40) \quad \llbracket car \rrbracket = \lambda x_k [\mathbf{car}(x)]$$

In order to make this property something that can be predicated of ordinary objects, it must be transformed into a property of token entities and not kinds. They suggest, following related proposals by Déprez (2005) and Müller-Reichau (2011), that NumP is the locus for this operation. This is illustrated in (41), where R is a variant of Carlson (1977)'s realization relation, which relates kinds to individuals that instantiate them.



$$(42) \quad \llbracket \llbracket \llbracket \text{NumP} [\text{NP } car] \rrbracket \rrbracket \rrbracket = \lambda y \exists x_k [\mathbf{car}(x_k) \wedge R(y, x_k)]$$


This has the benefit of providing a transparent mapping between syntax and semantics. I will assume a version of this in my analysis, where *some* plays the role of a Num head and realizes kinds.

5. Analysis

5.1. Structure of the exclamative

The basic core of a *some*-exclamative such as *John is some lawyer!* would be represented as in (43). I assume that these exclamatives are built essentially from a standard sentential core, with the crucial difference being the use of an exclamative operator EX-OP merged in C. The intonational contour of *some*-exclamatives is assumed to mark the presence of this otherwise covert operator.

(43)



5.2. The representation of *some* sentences

As discussed earlier, *some* is an epistemic indefinite, requiring that the speaker not have precise knowledge as to the identity of some individual. Although the particular way that this gets cashed out in different theoretical analyses varies, there are several that are especially worth attention here. The first that of Farkas (2002). Farkas analyzes *some* as requiring that the variable it contributes be unidentified—that is, that the value that variable is assigned not necessarily be the same across all possibilities. In essence, this is a way of ensuring that the speaker can never commit to a particular valuation for that variable.

A second is that of Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito (2010). They propose that the ignorance implicature of Spanish *algún*, which is similar to *some* in some respects, can be modeled through competition with *un*. They analyze *algún* as in (44), where *algún* combines first with a subset selection function f , a function from sets to sets. The use of the subset selection function models contextual domain restriction. f in this analysis is restricted via the presupposition **anti-singleton**(f) so that its range must be a non-singleton set. When f combines with the

restrictor of *algún*, the NP, the effect is to make it so that there must be at least two individuals that could possibly satisfy the existential claim. *Un* is analyzed as not having the anti-singleton presupposition, and the ignorance component of *algún* surfaces as an implicature through competition with *un*.

$$(44) \quad \llbracket \text{algún} \rrbracket = \lambda f \lambda P \lambda Q : \text{anti-singleton}(f). \exists x [f(P)(x) \wedge Q(x)]$$

Finally, there is von Fintel (2000). This analysis is not about *some* per se, but about *whatever*, which also includes a sense of uncertainty about it.³ Von Fintel builds on Dayal (1997)'s analysis of *whatever* in assuming that *whatever* includes a presupposition of ignorance. The presupposition is most relevant for my purposes here, in that it forces the speaker to not be able to identify which particular individual across worlds satisfies the predicate *P*, just that there are at least two.

$$(45) \quad \text{whatever}(w)(F)(P)(Q)$$

- a. Presupposes: $\exists w', w'' \in F : \iota x.P(w')(x) \neq \iota x.P(w'')(x)$
- b. Asserts: $\forall w' \in F : Q(w')(\iota x.P(w')(x))$

What these proposals have in common is a general analytical intuition that epistemic indefinites and other morphemes that express ignorance impose a requirement that the speaker cannot commit to a particular individual. Rather, what these must do is leave as an open possibility that there are multiple individuals who could satisfy the descriptive claim that is being made. I borrow this intuition for my analysis of *some*.

For my purposes here, I adopt Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002)'s practice of analyzing all sentences—not only question sentences—as denoting sets of propositional alternatives. In particular, sentences making use of indefinites will have as their denotation a set of propositions that vary with respect to an individual (this will be developed in the next section). However, this formalization in and of itself does not build in a difference between the singular indefinite and *some*. To cash out the difference between the singular indefinite *a* and *some* in this sort of system, I give the principle in (46), the anti-singleton condition, which can be thought of as a use-condition associated with *some* but not *a*. What this principle serves to do is ensure that the speaker cannot narrow the set of alternatives to make an assertion about a single particular individual across worlds. This condition will be active in both normal sentences using *some*, and also exclamative sentences using *some*.

$$(46) \quad \text{Anti-singleton condition on } \textit{some}: \text{ A sentence containing } \textit{some} \text{ must denote a set containing at least two alternatives.}$$

In the following sections, I show how the alternatives at the core of the exclamative vary with respect to a kind, and how an exclamative operator applies to this set.

³In class notes, von Fintel has an analysis of *some* that is similar, according to Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito (2010). See von Fintel (1999).

5.3. The sentential core of *some*-exclamatives

Following the discussion the previously, I'll assume that NPs denote properties of kinds. The denotation for the NP *lawyer* will be the property corresponding to the lawyer-kind. This predicate will be true of any sub-kinds of the lawyer kind (or the kind LAWYER itself).

$$(47) \quad \llbracket \textit{lawyer} \rrbracket = \lambda k. \mathbf{lawyer}(k)$$

Based on proposals from Müller-Reichau (2011), Gehrke and McNally (2013) and others, Num will be the locus for shifting properties of kinds to properties of individuals. What shifts kinds to individuals in my analysis is *some*. Accordingly, *some* will be merged low, as a Num head, taking the NP as an argument, and yielding a property of individuals, as other indefinites do by assumption. The sentential core for a *some*-exclamative would be represented as in (48), where R is a realization relation. $R(x, y_k)$ is true just in case x is a realization of kind y_k .

$$(48) \quad \llbracket \textit{John is some lawyer} \rrbracket = \{p' : \exists x_k \text{ s.t. } p' = [R(\mathbf{j}, x_k) \wedge \mathbf{lawyer}(x_k)]\}$$

This representation of the sentence, though, still does not adequately model an exclamative meaning. In the next section, I propose an exclamative operator that is the final step in transforming the sentence into an exclamative.

5.4. The exclamative operator

A set of propositions isn't the right kind of semantic object to add to the discourse, as it is not a single truth value. In a non-exclamative sentence, a covert assertoric operator maps the set of alternatives corresponding to the sentence to a truth value (see Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito 2010 and Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002 for discussion on what this kind of operator would look like). In the case of an exclamative sentence, a different operator applies. This operator, EX-OP, differs from an assertion operator in that it expresses a speaker-oriented attitude towards a proposition, rather than asserting a proposition itself. This attitude towards a proposition is what is added to the discourse. The special exclamative intonation that is attached to the *some*-exclamative marks the presence of this covert exclamative operator.

The exclamative operator EX-OP I define as in (49). This operator applies to a set of propositions P , asserts that there is an ordering to P (e.g., an ordering based on a property such as unexpectedness or surprisal), and then asserts an attitude towards the maximal proposition on this scale of propositions ($\text{MAX}(P)$). This attitude is indexed to the speaker.

$$(49) \quad \llbracket \textit{Ex-Op} \rrbracket = \lambda P \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{there is a salient ordering for } P \text{ and} \\ \text{ATTITUDE}(\mathbf{speaker})(\text{MAX}(P)) \end{array} \right]$$

This building of a scale goes some way towards explaining why *some* and not *a* can be involved in generating an exclamative; as EX-OP imposes an ordering over the set of propositions, it will require a set for which there can be a non-trivial ordering. By entailing that there are at least two members, *some* will be suitable for this, while *a* will not be.

Applying EX-OP to the set of alternatives denoted by the sentence (e.g., a logical form such as in (48)) will yield a proposition such as in (50).

$$(50) \quad \llbracket \text{Ex-Op}(\text{John is some lawyer}) \rrbracket \\ = \text{there is a salient ordering for } \{p' : \exists x_k \text{ s.t. } p' = [R(\mathbf{j}, x_k) \wedge \text{lawyer}(x_k)]\} \text{ and} \\ \text{ATTITUDE}(\text{speaker})(\text{MAX}(\{p' : \exists x_k \text{ s.t. } p' = [R(\mathbf{j}, x_k) \wedge \text{lawyer}(x_k)]\}))$$

To summarize, *some* generates a set of alternatives that vary by subkinds instantiated by the subject. This set of alternatives is further constrained by a presupposition that says that this set must contain at least two alternatives in it. This constraint is what models the epistemic indefinite nature of *some* in other contexts. In the next section, I use this fact about *some* in conjunction with an exclamative operator to build the full meaning of *some*-exclamatives.

6. Addendum: Pejorativity and genericity in *some*-exclamatives

The majority of this paper has concentrated on what I've called the in-situ variant of the *some*-exclamative, where the DP containing *some* is in the position after the copula. In this section, I turn very briefly to the preposed variant.

The preposed variant is similar to the in-situ variant, in that both exclaim about some extreme property and the speaker asserts an attitude towards this. However, the preposed variant differs from the in-situ variant in that it requires a negative or pejorative evaluation on the part of the speaker; although the in-situ variant is compatible with this attitude, it does not require it. In other words, the preposed *some*-exclamative rules out any positive or neutral evaluation on the part of the speaker.

To illustrate this, consider the sentence in (51) with the (a) and (b) follow-ups. Both the (a) and (b) follow-ups are licit here, showing that the exclamative doesn't necessarily commit the speaker to either a positive or a negative evaluation of the subject; the speaker can use the exclamative to exclaim about John being both a good lawyer, and also a not very good lawyer.

- (51) John is some lawyer!
- a. He always wins his cases and does lots of pro bono work.
 - b. He loses every case and still charges a lot.

However, the preposed variant is different, as shown in (52), in that the (a) follow-up is incompatible with the exclamative while the (b) follow-up is still compatible. This shows that the exclamative in this case commits the speaker to a negative evaluation of John's abilities as a lawyer. This commitment to a negative evaluation rules out the follow-up in (a) that implicates a positive evaluation.

- (52) Some lawyer John is!
- a. #He always wins his cases and does lots of pro bono work.
 - b. He loses every case and still charges a lot.

One possibility is that the raising of the *some*-DP signals the presence of a syntactic projection encoding a pejorative attitude at the left edge of the clause. Similar proposals have been made for other phenomena, such as *shm*-reduplication in English (Grohmann and Nevins, 2004). But, a full analysis of the syntactic and semantic consequences of positing such a projection is beyond this paper.

Turning back to the role of genericity in *some*-exclamatives, one rub in the analysis in this paper is that perhaps *some*-exclamatives don't track the standard notion of kind very well, in that expressing surprise with respect to the subkind instantiated is marked. For instance, in (53), although knives with wooden handles and ceramic knives are subkinds of knives, the follow-ups in the (b) and (c) sentences suggest that the exclamation doesn't allow one to exclaim about these properties. Rather, the licitness of the (a) follow-up in (53) suggests that what the *some*-exclamative is exclaiming about is how the knife relates to the commonly associated event with knives, cutting. Similarly, the (b) follow-up in (54) is illicit, even though foot specialists are a kind of doctor. The (a) follow-up, which is licit, relates to the doctor's performance in doing his or her duties.

- (53) Some knife this is!
 a. It couldn't even cut this banana!
 b. #It has a wooden handle!
 c. #It's made of ceramic!
- (54) Some doctor he is!
 a. He couldn't diagnose my athlete's foot!
 b. #He's a foot specialist!

Although these examples do not (necessarily) weaken the claim I make that *some*-exclamatives involve kinds and genericity in some sense, it does raise questions about how to further define these notions with respect to *some*-exclamatives.

7. Conclusion

In this paper I've laid out an analysis of *some*-exclamatives, which have remained understudied in the broader literature on exclamatives. *Some*-exclamatives are interesting in that they show another example of an exclamative construction where the exclamation is not derived from morphology related to the formation of questions. The analysis I propose suggests a refinement of our understanding of exclamative sentences. Proposals such as those of Gutiérrez-Rexach (1996) and Zanuttini and Portner (2003) analyze exclamatives as having a question semantics. Recent work in the semantics of indefinites has argued that indefinites also have an alternative semantics associated with them, making them quite closely related semantically to questions. This connection allows us to very easily make sense of *some*-exclamatives and exclamatives as a whole; exclamative constructions are not about questionhood, as proposed by Gutiérrez-Rexach (1996) and Zanuttini and Portner (2003), but are rather about manipulating sets of alternatives.

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